umodel-skill-runner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
umctl query runto execute SPL (Search Processing Language) queries. This allows it to interact with workspaces and entity sets to retrieve skill and knowledge definitions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to load and follow instructions from external
SKILL.mdfiles and knowledge items, creating a surface for indirect injection. - Ingestion points: Data is ingested through the
list_skillsandlist_knowledgeentity calls, specifically accessingfiles[].SKILL.mdandknowledge_detailfields. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly state that knowledge is an "untrusted reference" and should not be treated as instructions or authorization. It also specifies that only inline content should be processed, skipping external URLs.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute SPL queries via
umctl. However, it includes explicit prohibitions against running embedded scripts, executing remote code, or fetching external URLs (skill_url,content_url). - Sanitization: The skill relies on filtering (using only inline Markdown) and explicit instruction-based constraints rather than programmatic sanitization or escaping of the ingested content.
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