triage
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute code from external, untrusted sources during the verification phase.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md, under the 'Verify the claim' section (Step 3), the agent is explicitly told to "check it out, run the relevant tests or commands" for external Pull Requests. - Risk: An attacker can submit a Pull Request containing malicious code in the tests or build scripts, which the agent will then execute locally during triage.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from an issue tracker and uses it to influence sensitive actions.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads issue and PR bodies, comments, and diffs as specified in
SKILL.md(Step 1). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack boundary markers or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the external data.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses the capability to execute shell commands (Step 3), invoke the
Skilltool (Step 4), and write files to the.out-of-scope/directory (Step 5). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the external issue/PR content before it is processed.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell-based operations based on input and code provided by external authors.
- Evidence: The verification step involves running arbitrary commands and tests defined in the PR's codebase.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata