triage

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 22, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute code from external, untrusted sources during the verification phase.
  • Evidence: In SKILL.md, under the 'Verify the claim' section (Step 3), the agent is explicitly told to "check it out, run the relevant tests or commands" for external Pull Requests.
  • Risk: An attacker can submit a Pull Request containing malicious code in the tests or build scripts, which the agent will then execute locally during triage.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from an issue tracker and uses it to influence sensitive actions.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads issue and PR bodies, comments, and diffs as specified in SKILL.md (Step 1).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack boundary markers or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the external data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses the capability to execute shell commands (Step 3), invoke the Skill tool (Step 4), and write files to the .out-of-scope/ directory (Step 5).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the external issue/PR content before it is processed.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell-based operations based on input and code provided by external authors.
  • Evidence: The verification step involves running arbitrary commands and tests defined in the PR's codebase.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 22, 2026, 09:17 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — triage