context7-efficient
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell scripts (
fetch-docs.sh,fetch-raw.sh,extract-code-blocks.sh,extract-notes.sh, andextract-signatures.sh) to orchestrate documentation retrieval and perform text processing. These scripts are executed directly by the agent environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npx -y @upstash/context7-mcpto download and execute the Context7 MCP server from the npm registry at runtime. While Upstash is a well-known service, the use ofnpx -yintroduces a dependency on external code that is resolved and executed during skill operation. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/mcp-client.pyutility usessubprocess.Popenwithshell=Trueto spawn the MCP server process. Although the command string is currently hardcoded in the shell scripts, this execution pattern increases the risk of command injection if user-controlled input were to reach the command string. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and summarize external documentation, which constitutes a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Documentation content is fetched from external sources via the Context7 MCP server.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to treat fetched documentation as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell scripts and perform subprocess calls.
- Sanitization: While the skill filters the documentation structurally (extracting code blocks, signatures, and notes using
awkandgrep) to save tokens, it does not perform content-level sanitization to identify or strip potential prompt injection payloads embedded in the documentation.
Audit Metadata