base
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The 'Credentials Management' section directs the agent to locate and parse a centralized 'access keys file' (e.g.,
~/Documents/Access.txt) to extract API keys for OpenAI, Anthropic, Render, and Replicate. This encourages storing multiple high-value secrets in an unencrypted plain text file. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions require the agent to access a sensitive file path (
~/Documents/Access.txt). Accessing such files to retrieve credentials for project configuration constitutes a significant data exposure risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The mandatory TDD workflow involves the agent executing various shell commands to run tests and linters (e.g.,
npm test,pytest,ruff,mypy). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a workflow where the agent writes and immediately executes its own code and tests, creating an attack surface for dynamically generated content.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from project specifications and todo lists in
_project_specs/(e.g.,active.md,current-state.md). It lacks specific boundary markers or sanitization, and when combined with the agent's capability to execute shell commands and write files, this creates a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata