credentials
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to access and read sensitive local files that traditionally contain authentication secrets, specifically targeting paths like
~/.secrets/keys.txtand~/.credentials.txtas well as user-provided locations like~/Documents/Access.txt. It extracts highly sensitive keys including AWS access keys, Stripe live keys, and Supabase service role keys. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations via
curlto transmit extracted API credentials to external service provider endpoints (includingapi.openai.com,api.anthropic.com,api.render.com, andapi.replicate.com) to validate key status. While these are well-known services, the pattern involves sending secrets over the network. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes multiple shell commands including
curlfor API requests,catfor creating.envfiles, andlsfor file discovery. It also suggests usingjqfor processing validation responses. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface because it is designed to ingest and parse untrusted content from local text files into the agent's context.
- Ingestion points: Processes content from user-specified or default credential files (e.g.,
SKILL.mdidentifies~/Access.txt). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are utilized when reading the file content.
- Capability inventory: The skill combines file reading (
Path.read_text), network validation (curl), and file writing (cat > .env), creating a chain that could be exploited if the ingested data contained malicious instructions. - Sanitization: The skill includes logic to mask credentials in terminal output (showing only the start and end of keys), which serves as a mitigation against accidental exposure in logs.
Audit Metadata