external-model-delegation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines a delegation pattern where user-supplied prompts are interpolated directly into shell command strings, such as
qwen3 "prompt"andkimi --quiet -p "prompt". This pattern creates an entry point for command injection if the user input contains shell metacharacters. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation instructs the user to store
DEEPSEEK_API_KEYandOPENAI_API_KEYdirectly within the~/.zshrcshell profile. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user prompts through an initial classification stage (
qwen3) which determines the command to be executed in the subsequent step. - Ingestion points: User prompts received through the
UserPromptSubmithook (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified in the routing flow to isolate prompt data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates shell command execution and network operations via
curl(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: While the bash template uses
jq --argfor output construction, the primary routing logic shown in the examples lacks evidence of shell-safe escaping for the initial command invocation. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: User prompts are sent to external services including DeepSeek, Kimi, and OpenAI via network requests initiated by delegation scripts using
curland third-party CLI binaries.
Audit Metadata