external-model-delegation

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines a delegation pattern where user-supplied prompts are interpolated directly into shell command strings, such as qwen3 "prompt" and kimi --quiet -p "prompt". This pattern creates an entry point for command injection if the user input contains shell metacharacters.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation instructs the user to store DEEPSEEK_API_KEY and OPENAI_API_KEY directly within the ~/.zshrc shell profile.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user prompts through an initial classification stage (qwen3) which determines the command to be executed in the subsequent step.
  • Ingestion points: User prompts received through the UserPromptSubmit hook (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the routing flow to isolate prompt data from instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill facilitates shell command execution and network operations via curl (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: While the bash template uses jq --arg for output construction, the primary routing logic shown in the examples lacks evidence of shell-safe escaping for the initial command invocation.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: User prompts are sent to external services including DeepSeek, Kimi, and OpenAI via network requests initiated by delegation scripts using curl and third-party CLI binaries.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 01:48 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — external-model-delegation