skills/alinaqi/maggy/gemini-review/Gen Agent Trust Hub

gemini-review

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to download and install an extension from an unverified GitHub repository: https://github.com/gemini-cli-extensions/code-review.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The command gemini extensions install [URL] downloads and executes third-party code at runtime from a source that is not recognized as a trusted organization or well-known service.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) by interpolating untrusted data (git diffs) directly into LLM prompts without sanitization or boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: Git diff output stored in diff.txt and read via $(cat diff.txt) in the CLI prompt.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the diff content is concatenated directly into the prompt string.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands, perform network operations via the Gemini CLI, and modify repository content.
  • Sanitization: None; the raw content of the diff is passed directly to the model.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to modify shell configuration files (~/.zshrc) to persist environment variables. While intended for authentication, modifying shell profiles is a common persistence mechanism pattern.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 14, 2026, 04:17 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gemini-review