icpg
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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill configures automated shell command execution through Claude settings hooks. The
PreToolUsehook is configured to executescripts/icpg-pre-edit.shwhenever an 'Edit' or 'Write' tool is matched. TheStophook is configured to executescripts/tdd-loop-check.shandscripts/icpg-stop-record.shupon session completion. This creates a persistent execution surface triggered by routine agent actions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the installation of a local package via
pip install ./scripts/icpg. This involves executing the installation logic (e.g., setup.py) of local scripts, which could be modified to perform arbitrary actions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
icpg bootstrapcommand ingests untrusted data in the form of git commit history and processes it through LLMs (OpenAI or Claude) to infer developer intent. This is a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection, where an attacker could craft commit messages designed to manipulate the inferred ReasonNodes or the agent's understanding of the codebase. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the use of external LLM services (OpenAI, Claude) and vector databases (ChromaDB) for its core functionality, requiring network access and external API interactions.
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