skills/alinaqi/maggy/icpg/Gen Agent Trust Hub

icpg

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill configures automated shell command execution through Claude settings hooks. The PreToolUse hook is configured to execute scripts/icpg-pre-edit.sh whenever an 'Edit' or 'Write' tool is matched. The Stop hook is configured to execute scripts/tdd-loop-check.sh and scripts/icpg-stop-record.sh upon session completion. This creates a persistent execution surface triggered by routine agent actions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the installation of a local package via pip install ./scripts/icpg. This involves executing the installation logic (e.g., setup.py) of local scripts, which could be modified to perform arbitrary actions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The icpg bootstrap command ingests untrusted data in the form of git commit history and processes it through LLMs (OpenAI or Claude) to infer developer intent. This is a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection, where an attacker could craft commit messages designed to manipulate the inferred ReasonNodes or the agent's understanding of the codebase.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the use of external LLM services (OpenAI, Claude) and vector databases (ChromaDB) for its core functionality, requiring network access and external API interactions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 14, 2026, 04:17 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — icpg