skills/alinaqi/maggy/llm-patterns/Gen Agent Trust Hub

llm-patterns

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The prompt templates provided in the skill (specifically in the classifyTicketPrompt function) demonstrate a pattern of direct string interpolation for user-provided data, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The ticket argument in the classifyTicketPrompt function in SKILL.md is interpolated directly into the system instructions.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit boundary markers (e.g., XML tags or "ignore instructions" warnings) are used to wrap the untrusted input.
  • Capability inventory: The provided code patterns include a network-capable LLM client wrapper (llmCall) using the Anthropic SDK.
  • Sanitization: The example code does not include logic to sanitize or escape the input string before it is passed to the LLM.
  • [SAFE]: The skill uses secure practices for credential management in its CI/CD examples, referencing GitHub Secrets (${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}) rather than hardcoding values.
  • [SAFE]: The code patterns include mandatory schema validation for LLM responses using the Zod library, which is a recommended security and reliability practice for handling unstructured model output.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 14, 2026, 04:17 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — llm-patterns