model-routing
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions for the agent to execute various shell scripts located in
~/bin/(e.g.,qwen3,gemini,deepseek,kimi). These scripts are used to delegate tasks to different AI backends. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The delegation commands (e.g.,
~/bin/qwen3 "prompt") interpolate the user's raw prompt directly into a shell command. An attacker could craft a prompt containing shell metacharacters (such as;,&&, or$()) to bypass the intended script and execute arbitrary commands on the host system. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill relies on a
UserPromptSubmithook located at~/.claude/hooks/route-task-hook. This mechanism ensures that the routing logic and associated scripts are executed automatically every time a user submits a prompt, which can be used to maintain persistent control or monitoring of agent activity. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill interacts with sensitive configuration files and environment variables, specifically targeting
~/.zshrcto accessDEEPSEEK_API_KEY,GEMINI_API_KEY, andOPENAI_API_KEY. It also reads and writes to several log and cache files in~/.claude/, which could contain history or metadata about the user's prompts and system state. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Evidence Chain:
- Ingestion points: User prompts are processed by the pipeline described in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: None identified. The prompt is passed as a bare string argument to shell scripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses subprocess calls via bash to execute
~/bin/scripts,catfor file access, andgrepfor searching. - Sanitization: No evidence of input escaping or sanitization is provided in the instructions, leaving the shell execution vulnerable.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata