polyphony
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill architecture involves an 'Identity Broker' that mounts sensitive credential directories from the host machine into Docker containers. Specifically, it mentions mounting
~/.claudeto/home/worker/.claude:ro. This exposes host-level CLI session tokens and authentication data to the containerized environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires and executes several CLI tools on the host system, including
docker,orbctl, and a localpolyphonybinary used for initialization and task spawning. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The worker runtime relies on an external Docker image,
polyphony-worker:latest, which is retrieved from a remote container registry at runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Tasks are sourced from GitHub Issues via the
gh api(referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when passing issue content to the agents.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to spawn Docker containers, execute git operations, and run agent CLI commands.
- Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content of GitHub issues before it is used to drive agent behavior and task routing.
Audit Metadata