skills/alinaqi/maggy/polyphony/Gen Agent Trust Hub

polyphony

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill architecture involves an 'Identity Broker' that mounts sensitive credential directories from the host machine into Docker containers. Specifically, it mentions mounting ~/.claude to /home/worker/.claude:ro. This exposes host-level CLI session tokens and authentication data to the containerized environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires and executes several CLI tools on the host system, including docker, orbctl, and a local polyphony binary used for initialization and task spawning.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The worker runtime relies on an external Docker image, polyphony-worker:latest, which is retrieved from a remote container registry at runtime.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from external sources.
  • Ingestion points: Tasks are sourced from GitHub Issues via the gh api (referenced in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when passing issue content to the agents.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to spawn Docker containers, execute git operations, and run agent CLI commands.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content of GitHub issues before it is used to drive agent behavior and task routing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 14, 2026, 04:17 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — polyphony