workspace
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive shell command execution using tools like
ls,grep,find,cat,mkdir,ln,git submodule, andjqto map repository topology and extract API contracts across monorepos and multi-repo environments. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: It employs relative path traversal (
cat ../*/.git/config) to access and analyze sibling directories, which may be outside the scope of the primary repository the agent is currently operating within. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: By reading
.git/configfiles with the commandcat ../*/.git/config 2>/dev/null | grep "url", the skill risks exposing sensitive authentication tokens or credentials that might be stored within Git remote URLs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: A significant indirect prompt injection surface exists because the skill processes untrusted data from various files throughout the workspace to create summary artifacts.
- Ingestion points: Processes content from
package.json, source code (.ts,.py), and schema files across the entire discovered workspace. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters are used to wrap ingested content or warn the agent about potential malicious instructions within analyzed data.
- Capability inventory: Utilizes shell execution (
grep,cat,find) and file system write access to generate and update documentation artifacts. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation before interpolation into generated summary files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill encourages the establishment of persistent development workflows by suggesting the creation of Git pre-commit hooks and GitHub Actions, which execute code automatically during the development lifecycle.
Audit Metadata