agent-harness

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Unsafe execution of shell commands in scripts/loop_controller.py.
  • The cmd_verify function uses subprocess.run(chk["cmd"], shell=True, ...) to execute verification checks.
  • The commands are retrieved from the state.json file, which is initialized from a plan.json file.
  • This pattern allows for arbitrary code execution if an attacker can influence the content of the plan or state files.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's architecture is based on loading executable instructions from data files.
  • loop_controller.py dynamically loads and executes logic provided in JSON format, bypassing static instruction analysis for the runtime commands.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a large surface for indirect injection in scripts/goal_compiler.py.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via the --goal CLI argument in goal_compiler.py.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The goal text is directly interpolated into the task objective string (e.g., "Apply skill '...' toward goal: [GOAL_TEXT]").
  • Capability inventory: The skill has high-privilege capabilities including arbitrary shell command execution via loop_controller.py.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The raw goal string is used in the plan generation without escaping or filtering malicious natural language instructions.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 28, 2026, 01:47 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — agent-harness