agent-harness
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/loop_controller.pyscript usessubprocess.run()withshell=Trueto execute verification commands stored in the task plan. This allows the execution of any system command provided in the JSON input. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's core logic involves loading and executing commands dynamically from external JSON files (
plan.jsonandstate.json). There is no restricted environment or whitelist for these commands, meaning the skill's security depends entirely on the integrity of these data files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
--goalargument inscripts/goal_compiler.py, which determines which tasks and commands are added to the execution plan. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested goal string before it is processed into the task list.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute arbitrary subprocesses, read/write files for state management, and manage directory structures across the repository (
scripts/loop_controller.py,scripts/harness_manifest_builder.py). - Sanitization: The command strings pulled from the plan are executed without sanitization or validation against a safe command schema.
Audit Metadata