agent-harness
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Unsafe execution of shell commands in
scripts/loop_controller.py. - The
cmd_verifyfunction usessubprocess.run(chk["cmd"], shell=True, ...)to execute verification checks. - The commands are retrieved from the
state.jsonfile, which is initialized from aplan.jsonfile. - This pattern allows for arbitrary code execution if an attacker can influence the content of the plan or state files.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's architecture is based on loading executable instructions from data files.
loop_controller.pydynamically loads and executes logic provided in JSON format, bypassing static instruction analysis for the runtime commands.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a large surface for indirect injection in
scripts/goal_compiler.py. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via the
--goalCLI argument ingoal_compiler.py. - Boundary markers: Absent. The goal text is directly interpolated into the task objective string (e.g.,
"Apply skill '...' toward goal: [GOAL_TEXT]"). - Capability inventory: The skill has high-privilege capabilities including arbitrary shell command execution via
loop_controller.py. - Sanitization: Absent. The raw goal string is used in the plan generation without escaping or filtering malicious natural language instructions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata