agent-memory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes session transcripts to extract and re-inject facts into the agent's context, creating an indirect prompt injection surface. However, this is mitigated by a multi-stage promotion logic that requires facts to recur across multiple sessions and calendar days, and a mandatory human review step ('adopt' command) before any memory is committed to the project's durable configuration. \n
- Ingestion points:
scripts/memory_extract.pyreads JSONL transcripts from~/.claude/projects/.\n - Boundary markers: Memory atoms are injected into context; contested claims are explicitly tagged with conflict notes.\n
- Capability inventory: Local file read/write, string/regex processing. No network access or subprocess execution.\n
- Sanitization:
scripts/memory_core.pyimplements a comprehensive lexical redaction filter targeting AWS keys, GitHub tokens, API keys (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, Stripe), private keys, JWTs, and database connection strings. \n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: No network exfiltration vectors were detected. The skill specifically avoids external dependencies and network calls ('stdlib only'). It handles local files with restricted permissions (0600/0700) and de-identifies paths before promotion to L2/L3 by stripping OS usernames from back-pointers. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local Python scripts for its operations. These scripts are self-contained, do not invoke external binaries, and avoid dangerous functions likeeval()orexec()for processing external data.
Audit Metadata