chaos-engineering
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMMETADATA_POISONINGPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The
authorfield in theSKILL.mdfrontmatter is defined asclaude-code-skills, which does not match the identified skill authoralirezarezvani. This discrepancy in metadata is misleading regarding the origin and provenance of the skill content. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill's documentation and reference files (
attack_taxonomy.md,references/chaos_principles.md) explicitly encourage and provide instructions for using high-privilege system tools such astc(traffic control),iptables, andstress-ng. These tools require root or administrative privileges to modify kernel-level network shaping, drop packets, or saturate system resources, representing a significant privilege escalation risk if misused. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The provided
scripts/experiment_postmortem.pyscript parses external data from user-supplied log files to generate postmortem reports, which could be exploited to inject instructions into the agent's context. - Ingestion points: The script reads content from a local file path provided via the
--result-logcommand-line argument inscripts/experiment_postmortem.py. - Boundary markers: The script does not implement boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the parsed log content.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides tools for experiment design and postmortem analysis, while referencing external capabilities for high-privilege system modifications (network shaping, process termination, resource exhaustion).
- Sanitization: While the script performs a check for blame-related keywords (
BLAME_PHRASES), it does not sanitize the ingested log data for markdown injection or embedded natural language instructions before incorporating them into the final report.
Audit Metadata