chaos-engineering

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMMETADATA_POISONINGPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The author field in the SKILL.md frontmatter is defined as claude-code-skills, which does not match the identified skill author alirezarezvani. This discrepancy in metadata is misleading regarding the origin and provenance of the skill content.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill's documentation and reference files (attack_taxonomy.md, references/chaos_principles.md) explicitly encourage and provide instructions for using high-privilege system tools such as tc (traffic control), iptables, and stress-ng. These tools require root or administrative privileges to modify kernel-level network shaping, drop packets, or saturate system resources, representing a significant privilege escalation risk if misused.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The provided scripts/experiment_postmortem.py script parses external data from user-supplied log files to generate postmortem reports, which could be exploited to inject instructions into the agent's context.
  • Ingestion points: The script reads content from a local file path provided via the --result-log command-line argument in scripts/experiment_postmortem.py.
  • Boundary markers: The script does not implement boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the parsed log content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill provides tools for experiment design and postmortem analysis, while referencing external capabilities for high-privilege system modifications (network shaping, process termination, resource exhaustion).
  • Sanitization: While the script performs a check for blame-related keywords (BLAME_PHRASES), it does not sanitize the ingested log data for markdown injection or embedded natural language instructions before incorporating them into the final report.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 02:21 PM