hivemind

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the opencode and claude CLI tools via node:child_process. These calls are used to spawn background workers, check service status, and perform benchmarks. Arguments are passed as arrays, which avoids shell-based command injection vulnerabilities.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill orchestrates external AI workers and brings their output back into the primary agent's context. This constitutes an indirect prompt injection surface where a sub-agent's output could potentially influence the primary agent's instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Worker results are parsed from NDJSON streams in scripts/oc-worker.mjs and returned as a single JSON line to the primary agent.
  • Boundary markers: The skill enforces a 'Golden Rule' where worker output only enters the context via the script's structured JSON response, providing a clear boundary and avoiding context flooding.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestration commands have access to file system tools (Read, Edit, Grep, Glob) and execution tools (Bash).
  • Sanitization: The oc-worker.mjs script truncates worker output to a maximum of 20,000 characters.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the opencode-ai global NPM package to be installed by the user. At runtime, the CLI communicates with the opencode.ai service to facilitate task delegation to remote models.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: As an orchestration layer for an external service, the skill sends task-related data to opencode.ai endpoints via the CLI. The SKILL.md documentation includes a clear warning to users not to send secrets or private code to the workers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 24, 2026, 03:24 AM