notebooklm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources including URLs, YouTube links, Google Docs, and local files, which are subsequently processed by the NotebookLM interface.\n
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mddefines sub-flows for adding sources (URL, text, file, Google Doc) and querying notebooks via chat interface.\n - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured prompt templates in
scripts/custom_prompt_template_generator.pybut lacks explicit instructions for the target LLM to ignore instructions embedded within the ingested source material.\n - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes browser automation capabilities (
navigate,click,type,screenshot) and a dedicated file upload tool.\n - Sanitization: External content and user-provided parameters are interpolated into prompt templates and typed into the browser without explicit filtering or escaping.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill accepts absolute file paths from the user to perform file uploads through the browser automation environment and executes local scripts for action routing and classification.\n
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdspecifies a sub-flow for 'File Upload' using user-provided absolute paths and invokes scripts such asscripts/async_action_classifier.pyfor operational logic.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill navigates to Google's NotebookLM service and may fetch content from external websites as directed by the user.\n - Evidence:
SKILL.mddirects the agent to navigate tohttps://notebooklm.google.comand provides functionality to add sources via URLs. These actions target well-known services or are user-directed, and are documented as part of the skill's primary function.
Audit Metadata