procurement-optimizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The author name specified in the skill's YAML frontmatter ('claude-code-skills') does not match the provided author metadata ('alirezarezvani'). This inconsistency can be deceptive regarding the skill's origin and ownership.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user data provided in JSON format, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in spend data.
- Ingestion points: The scripts 'spend_categorizer.py', 'purchasing_cycle_analyzer.py', and 'supplier_consolidation.py' ingest data from user-supplied files such as 'spend.json', 'pos.json', and 'suppliers.json'.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or specific instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious prompts within the ingested data fields like 'description' or 'category_hint'.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes Python scripts that perform file system read and write operations using 'pathlib'.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the input JSON fields to prevent the interpolation of malicious instructions into the agent's context during the synthesis phase.
Audit Metadata