research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from external websites using
WebSearchandWebFetchto generate research briefings. This creates a surface where malicious web content could embed instructions to manipulate the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: External data fetched from the internet during the 'Read + extract' phase as described in
SKILL.mdandreferences/fallback_workflow_canon.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded content within fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to web search and fetching tools, academic databases via
Consensus MCP, and local file write capabilities. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for sanitizing or filtering content extracted from web sources before it is processed into final briefings.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes local Python scripts (
scripts/classifier.py,scripts/fallback_decomposer.py, andscripts/routing_transparency_logger.py) to manage its routing and decomposition logic. These scripts handle user research queries as command-line arguments. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill uses
scripts/routing_transparency_logger.pyto create and write to a hidden directory (~/.research_sessions/) in the user's home folder. This provides a mechanism for local data persistence by storing a history of research questions and routing decisions across multiple invocations.
Audit Metadata