senior-computer-vision
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes computer vision datasets consisting of images and structured annotations in COCO (JSON), Pascal VOC (XML), and YOLO (TXT) formats. This provides a surface for indirect prompt injection if the agent interprets text content within these files as instructions.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/dataset_pipeline_builder.pyandscripts/vision_model_trainer.pyscripts read images and structured annotation files from local directories. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or explicit instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded within annotation metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes scripts for file system management (read, write, symlink) and provides workflows for model training, optimization, and deployment.
- Sanitization: Standard libraries are used for parsing (json, xml.etree.ElementTree, yaml), but there is no semantic sanitization of the annotation content.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/inference_optimizer.pyscript uses thetorch.load()function for model analysis. - Evidence: Found in the
_analyze_pytorchand_benchmark_pytorchmethods ofscripts/inference_optimizer.py. - Finding: The
torch.load()function utilizes the Pythonpicklemodule, which is susceptible to arbitrary code execution if a maliciously crafted model file is loaded. While common in PyTorch workflows, this constitutes unsafe deserialization of local data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches configuration and pre-trained weights from well-known frameworks.
- Evidence:
scripts/vision_model_trainer.pyreferencesdetectron2://URIs for official model zoo resources. - Finding: The skill integrates with established computer vision frameworks that may download official pre-trained weights during initial execution.
Audit Metadata