setup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute a Python script (
setup_experiment.py) that takes several user-provided arguments, including a raw shell command via the--evalparameter. This functionality allows for the execution of arbitrary commands on the host system. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions specify the assembly of a shell command using string interpolation of user-supplied variables:
python {skill_path}/scripts/setup_experiment.py --domain {domain} --name {name} --target {target} --eval "{eval_cmd}" .... The use of double quotes around{eval_cmd}is insufficient to prevent command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters like backticks, semicolons, or subshell expansions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an attack surface where untrusted data (user input for experiment parameters) is ingested and used in sensitive system operations.
- Ingestion points: User-provided strings for the experiment
domain,name,targetfile, and theeval_cmddefined in the interactive setup flow inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None. The skill does not provide any instructions to the agent to validate or delimit these inputs to prevent them from being interpreted as code or instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands and access the local file system (via the
targetparameter). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping logic applied to the user input before it is concatenated into the final shell command.
Audit Metadata