claude-md-drift-audit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's instructions direct the agent to interpolate user-provided input (
$ARGUMENTS) directly into shell commands, such asgit log --since="$ARGUMENTS days ago". This creates a potential command injection vector if the input is not strictly validated or sanitized by the underlying agent platform.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from the repository's git history and documentation files and processes them without sanitization or explicit boundaries.\n - Ingestion points: The skill reads
CLAUDE.mdfiles,*.claude/rules/*.mdfiles, git log output, and dependency manifest files (e.g.,package.json,requirements.txt).\n - Boundary markers: None present. The instructions do not define delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore instructions embedded in the audited data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Read,Glob,Grep, and restrictedBashcommands (git,find) to interact with the file system and project metadata.\n - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested content is performed before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata