claude-md-drift-audit
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates the
$ARGUMENTSvariable directly into shell commands within the instruction set. Specifically, the variable is placed inside double quotes ingit log --since="$ARGUMENTS days ago"andgit diff "@{$ARGUMENTS days ago}". A user could provide a malicious argument (e.g.,7" ; rm -rf / ; #) that breaks out of the intended command structure to execute arbitrary bash commands on the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted data from the project's file system and version history.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads the contents of
CLAUDE.mdfiles and output fromgit logandgit diffcommands. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious directions embedded within the audited files or commit messages.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Read,Grep,Bash(git log:*),Bash(git diff:*),Bash(git status:*), andBash(find:*). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from the audited files or git history before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata