claude-md-drift-audit

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates the $ARGUMENTS variable directly into shell commands within the instruction set. Specifically, the variable is placed inside double quotes in git log --since="$ARGUMENTS days ago" and git diff "@{$ARGUMENTS days ago}". A user could provide a malicious argument (e.g., 7" ; rm -rf / ; #) that breaks out of the intended command structure to execute arbitrary bash commands on the host system.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted data from the project's file system and version history.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads the contents of CLAUDE.md files and output from git log and git diff commands.
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious directions embedded within the audited files or commit messages.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to Read, Grep, Bash(git log:*), Bash(git diff:*), Bash(git status:*), and Bash(find:*).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from the audited files or git history before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Nov 10, 2026, 02:10 PM