skills/alirezarezvani/gaios/audit/Gen Agent Trust Hub

audit

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions explicitly direct the agent to read the .env file to verify the presence of API keys and connection mechanisms. Accessing environment files is a sensitive operation as they are a primary location for plaintext credentials and secrets.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted project data, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads CLAUDE.md, MEMORY.md, and multiple files within the .claude/skills/ and .claude/agents/ directories.
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions to wrap ingested content in delimiters or ignore potential embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local filesystem (saving audit reports to the audits/ directory).
  • Sanitization: The skill does not implement any sanitization or validation for the content it reads from the project files.
  • [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes the dynamic context injection pattern !date +%Y-%m-%d in the SKILL.md file. This triggers shell command execution at load time to populate the date field. While the specific command is benign, the use of this syntax allows for pre-execution shell operations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 30, 2026, 07:19 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — audit