kubernetes-specialist
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and fetches manifests and installation scripts from several well-known infrastructure and CNCF projects.
- Evidence:
references/gitops.mdincludes commands to install ArgoCD and Flux manifests;references/service-mesh.mddownloads installation scripts from official Istio and Linkerd domains;references/multi-cluster.mdfetches theclusterctlbinary from Kubernetes Sigs and installation scripts from Submariner. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of CLI tools to manage and interact with cloud infrastructure.
- Evidence: Numerous commands using
kubectlandhelmare present throughout all reference files for deploying workloads, modifying configurations, and inspecting cluster state. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill includes instructions for performing tasks that require elevated system or cluster permissions.
- Evidence:
references/multi-cluster.mddemonstrates usingsudofor binary installation;references/troubleshooting.mdprovides patterns for debugging nodes using privileged containers andchroot /host. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation contains examples of sensitive data handling, including dummy credentials and methods to retrieve secrets.
- Evidence:
references/configuration.mdincludes example Secret manifests with placeholder keys likesk-1234567890abcdefand generic passwords;references/troubleshooting.mdprovides commands for extracting and base64-decoding credentials from the cluster. - [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy in the metadata regarding the author's identity.
- Evidence: The author field in the
SKILL.mdfrontmatter points to a GitHub profile (Jeffallan) that does not match the vendor context (alismx) associated with the skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to instructions embedded in external data retrieved from the cluster.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read
kubectl logs,kubectl describeoutput, and user-provided YAML manifests. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in cluster data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes powerful tools (
kubectl,helm) capable of modifying cluster state, executing code in containers, and managing network access. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of retrieved cluster data is implemented in the provided instructions.
Audit Metadata