kubernetes-specialist

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and fetches manifests and installation scripts from several well-known infrastructure and CNCF projects.
  • Evidence: references/gitops.md includes commands to install ArgoCD and Flux manifests; references/service-mesh.md downloads installation scripts from official Istio and Linkerd domains; references/multi-cluster.md fetches the clusterctl binary from Kubernetes Sigs and installation scripts from Submariner.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of CLI tools to manage and interact with cloud infrastructure.
  • Evidence: Numerous commands using kubectl and helm are present throughout all reference files for deploying workloads, modifying configurations, and inspecting cluster state.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill includes instructions for performing tasks that require elevated system or cluster permissions.
  • Evidence: references/multi-cluster.md demonstrates using sudo for binary installation; references/troubleshooting.md provides patterns for debugging nodes using privileged containers and chroot /host.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation contains examples of sensitive data handling, including dummy credentials and methods to retrieve secrets.
  • Evidence: references/configuration.md includes example Secret manifests with placeholder keys like sk-1234567890abcdef and generic passwords; references/troubleshooting.md provides commands for extracting and base64-decoding credentials from the cluster.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy in the metadata regarding the author's identity.
  • Evidence: The author field in the SKILL.md frontmatter points to a GitHub profile (Jeffallan) that does not match the vendor context (alismx) associated with the skill.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to instructions embedded in external data retrieved from the cluster.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read kubectl logs, kubectl describe output, and user-provided YAML manifests.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in cluster data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes powerful tools (kubectl, helm) capable of modifying cluster state, executing code in containers, and managing network access.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of retrieved cluster data is implemented in the provided instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 22, 2026, 11:05 PM