sre-engineer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains multiple templates and examples that utilize
subprocess.runto execute system-level utilities for automation and monitoring.\n - Evidence: Use of
kubectl rollout restartandkubectl execinSKILL.mdandreferences/automation-toil.md; use ofdf,find, andcurlinreferences/automation-toil.md; andtcandiptablesinreferences/incident-chaos.md.\n - Context: These commands are used appropriately within the context of SRE tasks like self-healing and chaos engineering.\n- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Several scripts provided as references perform operations that typically require elevated privileges on a production system.\n
- Evidence: Scripts in
references/automation-toil.mdandreferences/incident-chaos.mdinteract withsystemctl,iptables, andtcto manage services and network configurations.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a workflow where the agent ingests external operational data, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: Monitoring metrics from Prometheus (
SKILL.md), system logs (references/monitoring-alerting.md), and incident descriptions (references/incident-chaos.md).\n - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific instructions or delimiters to isolate ingested data from the agent's core instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill provides capabilities for arbitrary command execution via
subprocess.run, Kubernetes management viakubectl, and service control viasystemctlacrossSKILL.mdandreferences/automation-toil.md.\n - Sanitization: Absent; while URL encoding is used for internal API queries, there is no evidence of sanitization for broader data ingestion like log content or incident reports.
Audit Metadata