sre-engineer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains multiple templates and examples that utilize subprocess.run to execute system-level utilities for automation and monitoring.\n
  • Evidence: Use of kubectl rollout restart and kubectl exec in SKILL.md and references/automation-toil.md; use of df, find, and curl in references/automation-toil.md; and tc and iptables in references/incident-chaos.md.\n
  • Context: These commands are used appropriately within the context of SRE tasks like self-healing and chaos engineering.\n- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Several scripts provided as references perform operations that typically require elevated privileges on a production system.\n
  • Evidence: Scripts in references/automation-toil.md and references/incident-chaos.md interact with systemctl, iptables, and tc to manage services and network configurations.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a workflow where the agent ingests external operational data, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
  • Ingestion points: Monitoring metrics from Prometheus (SKILL.md), system logs (references/monitoring-alerting.md), and incident descriptions (references/incident-chaos.md).\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific instructions or delimiters to isolate ingested data from the agent's core instructions.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill provides capabilities for arbitrary command execution via subprocess.run, Kubernetes management via kubectl, and service control via systemctl across SKILL.md and references/automation-toil.md.\n
  • Sanitization: Absent; while URL encoding is used for internal API queries, there is no evidence of sanitization for broader data ingestion like log content or incident reports.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 22, 2026, 11:04 PM