cri-o
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for performing high-privilege system tasks using
sudo, including managing thecrioservice viasystemctl, editing system configuration files in/etc/crio/, and executing interactive shell commands within containers usingcrictl exec. This functionality is consistent with the skill's primary purpose of container runtime administration. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
references/install-and-setup.mddocumentation includes commands to download repository keys and software binaries frompkgs.k8s.ioandgithub.com. These sources are recognized as official and well-known providers for the Kubernetes and container networking ecosystems. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: An indirect prompt injection surface is identified as the skill enables the agent to read and process potentially untrusted data from the system environment.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to use
crictl logsandcrictl inspectto retrieve container output and metadata, as described inreferences/command-cookbook.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or provide explicit warnings to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within log content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to administrative capabilities, including configuration modification (
sudo vi), service restarts, and command execution within containers (crictl exec), as outlined inSKILL.mdandreferences/crio-configuration.md. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the data retrieved from tool outputs is included in the workflows.
Audit Metadata