markdownlint
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation scripts (scripts/install.sh and scripts/install.ps1) use sudo to install system dependencies via package managers such as apt, dnf, and pacman. This behavior represents a privilege escalation vector if the agent is granted sudo access.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's setup and execution paths involve downloading packages from the npm registry, specifically markdownlint-cli2 via npm install -g or npx fallbacks.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The scripts/run-markdownlint-cli2.sh wrapper script executes npx --yes markdownlint-cli2 when the binary is not found locally. This results in the download and execution of remote code from the npm registry during the skill's operation.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection attack surface because it ingests and processes untrusted Markdown data from the workspace.
- Ingestion points: Target Markdown files (e.g., README.md, **/*.md) identified in SKILL.md and scripts/run-markdownlint-cli2.sh.
- Boundary markers: No delimiters or warnings are used to isolate untrusted file content from the linter's processing logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell scripts and modify files on the system using the --fix functionality.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of Markdown content before it is passed to the linting tool.
Audit Metadata