ibm-maximo
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill identifies the exact location of sensitive configuration files used by the application.
- Evidence:
C:\\IBM\\SMP\\maximo\\applications\\maximo\\properties\\maximo.propertiesis listed as a master properties file. This file typically contains database credentials (username, password, and URL) and other system-level secrets in IBM Maximo environments. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external API endpoints, creating a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The scripts in
gemini.mdandgpt.mdfetch work order and asset information from external OSLC REST API endpoints. - Boundary markers: The skill does not provide specific instructions or delimiters to mark API data as untrusted or separate from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform network requests (
requests.get,curl) and access local file paths. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of data sanitization or validation performed on the API responses before they are processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides commands for high-privilege administrative operations.
- Evidence: Commands such as
configdb.bat(structural database schema modification) andbuildmaximoear.bat(application archive deployment) are included. These commands can significantly modify the state and availability of the enterprise environment. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill includes instructions to bypass application-level authorization checks.
- Evidence: The Jython script in
SKILL.mdutilizes theMboConstants.NOACCESSCHECKconstant when updating field values, which explicitly instructs the Maximo engine to bypass standard user permission checks for those specific operations. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs network operations to external domains that are not on the standard whitelist.
- Evidence: The scripts interact with
https://maximo.enterprise.io. While used as a placeholder, these operations involve sending authentication headers (API keys) to remote infrastructure.
Audit Metadata