kicad
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references official KiCad Docker images (
kicad/kicad:8.0) and the community-standard InteractiveHtmlBom plugin. These are well-known resources within the electronics engineering ecosystem and are used for their intended purposes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python scripts use
subprocess.runto call external KiCad utilities likegenerate_interactive_bom.py. This is a standard method for integrating KiCad's modular tools into an automated workflow. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests external S-expression files (
.kicad_pcb,.kicad_sch). - Ingestion points: External KiCad PCB and schematic files are loaded via
pcbnew.LoadBoard()and parsed by the provided automation scripts. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore embedded comments within the ECAD files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the file system (
board.Save()) and execute shell commands viasubprocess.run. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization of text fields within the S-expression files (like component values or notes) before they are processed, though the risk is minimized by the highly structured nature of the EDA data format.
Audit Metadata