alibabacloud-agentloop-management
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies and manages an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from external documentation and processes runtime logs/traces which may contain user prompts.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/instrumentation/fetch_docs.pyretrieves content from help.aliyun.com and GitHub; the Pipeline and Evaluation domains process trace and log data. - Boundary markers: Data is handled using JSON structures and SQL literal escaping to maintain clear separation between data and instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (via the
aliyunCLI) and perform network requests to validated domains. - Sanitization: Scripts implement JSON parsing for all data ingestion and SQL quoting (
sql_quote) to prevent injection in queries sent to the Log Service (SLS). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves documentation and library references via
scripts/instrumentation/fetch_docs.py. This activity is restricted to the vendor's official help site (help.aliyun.com) and whitelisted GitHub organizations (alibaba,open-telemetry). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Python wrappers (
agentloop_eval.py,agentloop_pipeline.py) are used to invoke thealiyunCLI. These scripts implement defense-in-depth validation, including checking for null bytes or newlines in arguments and enforcing a binary allow-list, while avoiding the use ofshell=Truein subprocess calls.
Audit Metadata