alibabacloud-dts-task-query
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/query_dts_tasks.pyutilizessubprocess.run()to executealiyun-clicommands. The parameters, such as region and job type, are validated against a hardcoded whitelist of supported Alibaba Cloud regions, which prevents arbitrary command injection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile includes forceful instructions using language like 'CRITICAL OUTPUT COMPLETENESS REQUIREMENT' and 'MANDATORY - Model Response Rules'. While these use patterns associated with instruction overrides, they are functionally intended to ensure the AI does not truncate or summarize technical data, preserving the integrity of the reported task lists.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external API calls via the
aliyun-cliand interpolates it into the agent's context. This creates a potential surface for indirect injection if the source data were untrusted, though the source here is the official vendor API. - Ingestion points: Data enters the system via
subprocess.runoutput inscripts/query_dts_tasks.pywhich is then parsed as JSON. - Boundary markers: None identified. The skill does not use specific delimiters to wrap the external data within the final markdown output.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses
subprocess.runcapabilities to invoke thealiyunCLI tool for querying resources. - Sanitization: The script performs data filtering based on the
PayTypefield but does not apply string escaping or content sanitization to fields likeDtsJobNamebefore they are rendered into the report.
Audit Metadata