skills/aliyun/alibabacloud-aiops-skills/alibabacloud-maxcompute-migration-service/Gen Agent Trust Hub
alibabacloud-maxcompute-migration-service
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and provides commands to download the Aliyun CLI installation script and binaries from the official Alibaba Cloud CDN (
aliyuncli.alicdn.com). These resources are owned by the skill vendor and are used for environment initialization. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions include a command to download and execute a setup script via
bash -cfor installing or updating the Aliyun CLI tools. This pattern is restricted to the official vendor domain provided in the context of environment setup. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The installation guide suggests using
sudoto move the Aliyun CLI binary to the/usr/local/bin/directory, which is a standard procedure for installing command-line utilities on Unix-like systems. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted metadata (such as database and table names) from external data sources to generate migration plans.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via inventory APIs such as
list-mms-tablesandlist-mms-partitions(documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/commands-datasource-and-metadata.md). - Boundary markers: The skill implements a mandatory confirmation gate (Section 5, Step 4) where a full summary must be approved by the user before any migration job is created.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via the Aliyun CLI to create migration jobs, timers, and update mappings.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of metadata fields is mentioned before they are interpolated into planning summaries or CLI commands.
Audit Metadata