alibabacloud-maxcompute-migration-service

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and provides commands to download the Aliyun CLI installation script and binaries from the official Alibaba Cloud CDN (aliyuncli.alicdn.com). These resources are owned by the skill vendor and are used for environment initialization.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions include a command to download and execute a setup script via bash -c for installing or updating the Aliyun CLI tools. This pattern is restricted to the official vendor domain provided in the context of environment setup.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The installation guide suggests using sudo to move the Aliyun CLI binary to the /usr/local/bin/ directory, which is a standard procedure for installing command-line utilities on Unix-like systems.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted metadata (such as database and table names) from external data sources to generate migration plans.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the context via inventory APIs such as list-mms-tables and list-mms-partitions (documented in SKILL.md and references/commands-datasource-and-metadata.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill implements a mandatory confirmation gate (Section 5, Step 4) where a full summary must be approved by the user before any migration job is created.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via the Aliyun CLI to create migration jobs, timers, and update mappings.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of metadata fields is mentioned before they are interpolated into planning summaries or CLI commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 24, 2026, 09:37 AM