skills/aliyun/alibabacloud-aiops-skills/alibabacloud-nginx-ingress-to-alb-ingress/Gen Agent Trust Hub
alibabacloud-nginx-ingress-to-alb-ingress
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted Kubernetes Ingress YAML data provided by the user (via direct paste, file paths, or directory paths) to perform compatibility analysis and resource generation. This represents an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious instructions could be embedded within annotation values or other YAML metadata to influence the agent's behavior during the migration workflow.
- Ingestion points: User-provided YAML input processed in Step 1 (Parse Ingress YAML) of the skill's core workflow.
- Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or specific 'ignore embedded instructions' markers when the agent processes or interpolates the parsed configuration data into its reasoning context.
- Capability inventory: The agent generates complex Kubernetes manifests (AlbConfig, IngressClass, Ingress) and provides deployment shell commands (kubectl, dig) for the user to execute, which could be influenced by malicious input.
- Sanitization: The included helper script (
scripts/analyze-ingress-offline.sh) uses safe YAML parsing methods and regular expression-based extraction to identify specific configuration fields, which provides some structural validation of the input data.
Audit Metadata