long-document-evidence-reader
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Python
exec()function inscripts/rlm_repl.pyto run code generated by the LLM. While this is the primary intended functionality of the 'Recursive Language Model' pattern, the skill documentation explicitly notes that the environment is not a hardened sandbox, meaning the LLM-generated code could perform unauthorized actions if the runtime is not separately secured. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
ReplSessionclass inscripts/rlm_repl.pyuses the__import__function to dynamically load libraries (re,math,json,textwrap) into the execution context for the LLM. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted external data from PDFs and source code repositories, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/load_codebase.pyandscripts/load_pdf.pyingest content from entire directories and PDF files respectively. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or 'ignore' rules for content ingested from these external sources.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities, including arbitrary Python execution (
exec) and network-based LLM sub-calls (llm_query). - Sanitization: Document content is loaded directly into the context without sanitization or filtering for malicious instructions.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
DEFAULT_TEXT_EXTSlist inscripts/load_codebase.pyincludes.envfiles. This allows the skill to load and potentially exfiltrate sensitive environment variables or credentials if they are present in the repository being analyzed. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill allows the LLM to generate and execute logic to interact with the file system and external APIs, which poses a command execution risk if used in an environment without restricted permissions.
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