research-step
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The setup workflow in
workflows/init.mddirects the agent to install thebd(beads) command-line tool andjq. It instructs the agent to consult an external repository (https://github.com/gastownhall/beads) at runtime to find and follow installation instructions, which can involve executing remote scripts or using package managers from an untrusted third-party source. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill setup requires downloading software and documentation from the repository
github.com/gastownhall/beads, which is not a recognized trusted vendor or well-known service. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: The workflow processes user-controlled content from
mission.mdand structured task outputs stored in thebdtool. - Boundary markers: The skill uses YAML schemas (
assets/schemas.yaml) and structural validation scripts (scripts/validate-output.sh) to maintain output integrity. - Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to run bash scripts and the
bdCLI tool, which allows for file system operations and command execution based on the research state. - Sanitization: Content validation is restricted to structural and type checks; no NLP filtering is performed to identify or neutralize instructions embedded in input data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell execution to manage its lifecycle, including running custom bash scripts (
scripts/*.sh) and the third-party binarybdto update task metadata and summary files.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata