alova-server-usage
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions mandate that the agent fetch live documentation from
https://alova.js.orgto ensure accuracy. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in external content could influence agent behavior. Ingestion points: Documentation URLs listed inSKILL.md(e.g.,https://alova.js.org/api/method.md). Boundary markers: Absent. Capability inventory: The agent can perform network requests and data processing via the Alova library. Sanitization: Absent. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The documentation in
references/BFF_API_GATEWAY.mdcontains an example of a transparent reverse proxy implementation usingapp[method]('*', ...). This pattern forwards incoming requests (including URLs, headers, and bodies) without validation, creating a surface for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) if the target URL is not restricted to an allowlist. This pattern likely triggered the automated reputation scanner alert for malicious content. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is configured to fetch and process external documentation and configuration guidelines from
alova.js.orgat runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes standard documentation for installing library dependencies using the command
npm install alova.
Recommendations
- CRITICAL: 1 file(s) identified as malware by FileRep - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata