studio
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted user input to determine which external instruction sets to load and execute.
- Ingestion points: User input provided after the
/studiocommand is directly processed for intent classification as seen in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the user's task description.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to file system tools (
Read,Glob,Grep) and is explicitly instructed to "follow the agent's instructions" once a file is loaded from theagents/directory (SKILL.md, Rule 1). - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping of external content is performed before interpolation into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata