hyper-google-tagmanager

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, including website HTML, GTM container exports (JSON), and API responses. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in the data being audited.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/gtm-detect.sh (repository files), scripts/gtm-site-check.sh (served HTML), scripts/gtm-container-audit.sh (container JSON), and Tag Manager API responses.
  • Boundary markers: The Authority section in SKILL.md and rules/safety-gates.md §5 explicitly instruct the agent to treat all external content as evidence, not instructions, and to report rather than follow any embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for file system access (read/search/edit), shell command execution (bundled scripts), and network operations (via curl in scripts and API calls).
  • Sanitization: Data is processed using structured tools like jq and grep. The skill enforces a strict "evidence-based" verification workflow.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes bundled bash scripts (gtm-detect.sh, gtm-site-check.sh, gtm-container-audit.sh) to perform site and container audits. These scripts use standard utilities like curl, jq, and grep.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md and rules/gtm-workflow.md define the execution of these scripts as part of the audit and installation phases.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content from external sources for analysis and interacts with official Google APIs.
  • Evidence: scripts/gtm-site-check.sh uses curl to fetch website HTML and the gtm.js loader from googletagmanager.com. The skill also interacts with the Google Tag Manager API (tagmanager.googleapis.com). These are well-known services and are documented neutrally.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 19, 2026, 07:41 PM