alterlab-bgpt-search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to use
npxto download and run thebgpt-mcppackage and themcp-remoteutility from the NPM registry. These are external dependencies not bundled with the skill code. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The setup process involves running code downloaded via
npx, and the primary functionality relies on connecting to a remote MCP server athttps://bgpt.pro/mcp/sse, which executes server-side logic to provide tool responses to the agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Setup and alternative configuration require the user to execute shell commands involving
npxdirectly in their terminal. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: Structured data containing methods, results, and conclusions is ingested from the remote BGPT server via the
search_paperstool. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation does not mention any delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded instructions within the retrieved scientific data.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment permits
Bashtool usage and requires network access, which could be exploited if malicious content is processed by the agent. - Sanitization: There is no mention of filtering, validation, or sanitization of the content extracted from scientific papers before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata