alterlab-biopython
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and reference files encourage using the
subprocessmodule to execute external bioinformatics tools such asblastn,makeblastdb,clustalo,muscle, anddssp. These are standard tools in bioinformatics, but they represent a command execution capability via the skill's Bash tool access. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted biological data from external files and database records, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Biological files (FASTA, GenBank, PDB, etc.) are read from the local file system using
Bio.SeqIO,Bio.AlignIO,Bio.PDB, andBio.Phylomodules. Records are also fetched dynamically from NCBI databases. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not contain specific delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore instructions that might be embedded in record descriptions, metadata, or sequences.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the shell via the
Bashtool and is explicitly taught to usesubprocess.runto execute binaries. - Sanitization: While data is parsed into structured objects, there is no evidence of filtering or sanitizing natural language metadata that might be presented to the agent's context.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads biological sequences, structure files, and publication metadata from well-known and trusted scientific services including the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) via Entrez, the Protein Data Bank (PDB), and PubChem. These operations are neutral and intended for the skill's primary purpose.
Audit Metadata