alterlab-deep-research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages the
Bashtool to execute localized Python scripts for deterministic citation verification against academic databases. - Evidence:
agents/bibliography_agent.mdcontains instructions for the agent to runuv run python skills/core/alterlab-citation-verifier/scripts/verify_citations.pyto check the existence of curated sources. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core function of ingesting and synthesizing external, untrusted academic literature and web search results.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via the
WebSearchandWebFetchtools used by thebibliography_agent.mdandsource_verification_agent.mdduring literature searches and fact-checking. - Boundary markers: While the skill provides structured output templates and checkpoints for human review (e.g., in
SKILL.mdandreferences/orchestration_workflows.md), it lacks explicit technical delimiters or specific "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the raw data ingestion phase. - Capability inventory: The agent team has broad capabilities, including
Read,Write,Edit,Bash,WebFetch, andWebSearch, which could be exploited if malicious instructions in external papers are followed. - Sanitization: No specific technical sanitization or filtering of external content is described beyond the agent's internal evaluation logic and the use of the
alterlab-citation-verifierscript.
Audit Metadata