alterlab-docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Runtime compilation and process injection. The file
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains a C source code string (_SHIM_SOURCE) that is compiled into a shared object usinggccat runtime. This object is then injected into thesofficeprocess using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to intercept and redirect socket calls. This mechanism is used to bypass environment-specific socket restrictions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Dynamic script generation. The script
scripts/accept_changes.pygenerates a LibreOffice Basic macro (ACCEPT_CHANGES_MACRO) and writes it to a temporary user profile directory before executing it via thesofficecommand line to accept tracked changes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes several system utilities via
subprocess.run(), includingsofficefor document conversion,gccfor shim compilation, andgitfor generating diffs during validation inscripts/office/validators/redlining.py. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Surface for indirect prompt injection. The skill is designed to ingest and process external Word documents using
pandocand custom XML parsing logic. Maliciously crafted content or metadata within these documents could potentially override agent instructions during analysis. - Ingestion points:
pandocextraction commands inSKILL.mdandscripts/office/unpack.py. - Boundary markers: No explicit markers are used to isolate extracted text when interpolated into agent prompts.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (
soffice,gcc), file system access, and package management. - Sanitization: Uses the
defusedxmllibrary to mitigate standard XML-based attacks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions include a global installation command for the
docxpackage vianpm install -g docx. This is a standard dependency for the skill's functionality.
Audit Metadata