alterlab-literature-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/generate_pdf.pyutilizessubprocess.runto invoke thepandocandxelatexbinaries for document conversion. The command is constructed using a list of arguments rather than a raw shell string, which follows security best practices for preventing command injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/verify_citations.pyscript performs network requests to academic infrastructure such asdoi.organd the CrossRef API (api.crossref.org) to fetch paper metadata. These are official and well-known services for the scientific community. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and summarize data from external academic sources such as PubMed, arXiv, and bioRxiv. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if malicious content is present in the source metadata, although this risk is inherent to literature synthesis tools.
- Ingestion points: Search result JSON files and API responses from academic databases are processed by
scripts/search_databases.pyandscripts/verify_citations.py. - Boundary markers: The project uses a structured markdown template (
assets/review_template.md) to define where different types of content are placed. - Capability inventory: The skill is capable of file system writes (reports and PDFs) and executing specific document processing binaries via the shell.
- Sanitization: No specific filtering or escaping logic for LLM-based instructions within fetched paper metadata was observed.
Audit Metadata