alterlab-markitdown
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: The skill is designed to ingest and convert untrusted external files (PDF, DOCX, PPTX, XLSX, etc.) through the
MarkItDown.convert()andMarkItDown.convert_stream()methods, as documented inreferences/api_reference.mdand implemented inscripts/batch_convert.pyandscripts/convert_literature.py. - Boundary markers: Converted text content is appended directly to the agent's context without any protective delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings.
- Capability inventory: The skill's environment is configured with
Bash,Write,Edit, andReadtools, providing a high-impact execution environment if the agent obeys instructions embedded within a processed document. - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping of the converted Markdown content is performed before it is presented to the language model.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions to execute an unverified script.
- The
SKILL.mdfile explicitly instructs the agent to runpython scripts/generate_schematic.pyfor visual enhancements. This script is not included in the provided skill files, making it an external and unverifiable execution call. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Support for unverified third-party plugins.
- The documentation in
references/api_reference.mdandSKILL.mdpromotes a plugin system that loads external Python code at runtime. It encourages users to find and use plugins via public social tags (#markitdown-plugin), which could lead to the execution of malicious code from untrusted sources.
Audit Metadata