alterlab-paper-2-web
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to clone and execute code from an external repository not owned by the skill author.
- Evidence: Commands such as
git clone https://github.com/YuhangChen1/Paper2All.gitfollowed by execution ofpython pipeline_all.pyandpython pipeline_light.pyallow for the execution of arbitrary code within the agent's local environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill pulls software and utilities from multiple unverified external sources.
- Evidence: Downloads are initiated from
github.com/YuhangChen1for the core tool andgithub.com/oschwartz10612for Windows utilities, in addition to standard package managers. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to perform sensitive system configurations and run complex pipelines. - Evidence: Instructions include environment creation via
conda, dependency installation viapip, and system package management usingsudo apt-get install. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: There is a risk that malicious instructions could be embedded in the academic papers processed by the skill.
- Ingestion points: Academic papers in LaTeX or PDF format provided via the
input-dirparameter. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specified delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the papers.
- Capability inventory: The agent has
Bash,Write, andEdittools, which could be exploited if an injection causes it to execute malicious shell commands or modify system files. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or content sanitization is provided in the documentation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata