alterlab-pdf-explore
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external PDF documents which constitutes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. A malicious PDF could contain hidden instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during analysis.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from PDF files, as described in
SKILL.mdand tested inevals/evals.json. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to separate the untrusted PDF content from the agent's system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Read,Write,Edit, and shell execution viaBash(python:*)andBash(uv:*). - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of the PDF content is described prior to it being processed for Q&A or data extraction.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several external Python dependencies for its core functionality.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/pdf_explore_usage.mdmentionpymupdf(fitz),pdfplumber, andpytesseract(Tesseract OCR). The use ofuv runsuggests these packages will be retrieved from standard registries at runtime.
Audit Metadata