alterlab-pdf
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyimplements a monkeypatch on thepypdflibrary'sDictionaryObject.get_inheritedmethod to change how field attributes are retrieved. This is a form of dynamic code modification at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions and examples for executing various command-line utilities such as
qpdf,pdftotext,pdftk, andpdftoppmfor processing PDFs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external PDF files, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: PDF content is read by multiple scripts, including
scripts/extract_form_field_info.py,scripts/extract_form_structure.py,scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py, andscripts/fill_pdf_form_with_annotations.py. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions are used to isolate untrusted PDF content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can read from and write to the local filesystem.
- Sanitization: No sanitization of extracted PDF text is performed to prevent malicious instructions from being processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several standard PDF processing libraries from official registries, including Python packages like
pypdf,pdfplumber,reportlab,pytesseract,pdf2image,pypdfium2,pandas,Pillow, andnumpy, as well as Node.js libraries likepdf-libandpdfjs-dist.
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