alterlab-pptx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyperforms runtime compilation of a hardcoded C source file into a shared object (lo_socket_shim.so) usinggcc. This library is then injected into thesofficeprocess environment via theLD_PRELOADvariable. While intended as a workaround for socket restrictions in sandboxed environments, this represents a sophisticated process injection and dynamic execution pattern. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts utilize
subprocess.runto execute external system utilities. For instance,scripts/thumbnail.pyinvokessofficeandpdftoppmfor slide rendering, whilescripts/office/validators/redlining.pyexecutesgit diffto compare document revisions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to process untrusted external PowerPoint files, which constitutes an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through text extraction from
.pptxfiles as directed inSKILL.mdandediting.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the processed presentation content.
- Capability inventory: The skill leverages powerful system capabilities, including a compiler (
gcc), document converters (soffice), and file system access, which could be leveraged if malicious content is processed. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation for the natural language content extracted from user-provided presentation files.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata