alterlab-pyhealth

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation encourages the use of trainer.load() and torch.load() for managing model checkpoints, as seen in references/training_evaluation.md. These functions rely on the pickle module for deserialization, which is inherently unsafe and can lead to arbitrary code execution if a malicious model file is loaded.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests large medical datasets which serve as an untrusted data surface. 1. Ingestion points: MIMIC4Dataset and related classes loading from local paths (e.g., SKILL.md line 125). 2. Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded content were found in the dataset processing logic. 3. Capability inventory: The skill utilizes Bash(python:*) and Write capabilities. 4. Sanitization: No specific evidence of clinical text or metadata sanitization was observed before processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on Bash(python:*) for environment setup and model training, providing a direct execution path for potential payloads derived from other vulnerabilities.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs pyhealth and its dependencies from public registries via uv pip install. While standard for development, this requires supply chain monitoring in sensitive healthcare environments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 25, 2026, 02:36 PM