alterlab-pyhealth
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation encourages the use of
trainer.load()andtorch.load()for managing model checkpoints, as seen inreferences/training_evaluation.md. These functions rely on thepicklemodule for deserialization, which is inherently unsafe and can lead to arbitrary code execution if a malicious model file is loaded. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests large medical datasets which serve as an untrusted data surface. 1. Ingestion points:
MIMIC4Datasetand related classes loading from local paths (e.g.,SKILL.mdline 125). 2. Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded content were found in the dataset processing logic. 3. Capability inventory: The skill utilizesBash(python:*)andWritecapabilities. 4. Sanitization: No specific evidence of clinical text or metadata sanitization was observed before processing. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on
Bash(python:*)for environment setup and model training, providing a direct execution path for potential payloads derived from other vulnerabilities. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs
pyhealthand its dependencies from public registries viauv pip install. While standard for development, this requires supply chain monitoring in sensitive healthcare environments.
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