alterlab-pyzotero
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is subject to indirect prompt injection because it fetches untrusted data from the external Zotero Web API for agent processing.\n
- Ingestion points: Bibliographic metadata such as titles, abstracts, and full-text content are ingested via methods like
zot.items(),zot.top(), andzot.fulltext_item()as documented inreferences/read-api.mdandreferences/full-text.md.\n - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement or document the use of specific delimiters to separate untrusted API content from agent instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash,Write, andEdittools (defined inSKILL.md), which could be misused if instructions hidden in Zotero items are followed.\n - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content retrieved from the Zotero API before it is presented to the agent.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides standard shell commands for installing the required Python packages and using the pyzotero command-line interface.\n
- Evidence:
uv add pyzoteroanduv add "pyzotero[cli]"inSKILL.mdandreferences/cli.md.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs and uses standard libraries and CLI tools from the public PyPI registry.\n - Evidence: Downloads the
pyzoterolibrary as seen in the installation instructions.
Audit Metadata